	
  

CASE COMMENTARIES
CONTRACTS
In Tennessee, where a provision requiring consent to assign an agreement
is silent as to the standard of conduct governing a party’s decision whether
to consent, an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires the
parties to act in a commercially reasonable manner in making such
decision. Dick Broad. Co. v. Oak Ridge FM, Inc., 395 S.W.3d 653 (Tenn. 2013).
By Amanda Butterworth
In Tennessee, it is well established that common law imposes a duty of
good faith and fair dealing in the performance and enforcement of contracts. It is
equally well established that where the language of a contract is clear and
unambiguous, effect must be given to the intent of the parties. While several
jurisdictions continue to follow the traditional common-law view that consent
clauses that are silent as to the anticipated standard of conduct in assignment
provisions allow the parties to arbitrarily refuse consent, many jurisdictions now
follow a modern view requiring that the parties act in good faith and a
commercially reasonable manner. In Dick Broadcasting, the Tennessee Supreme
Court addressed whether an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
applies to require a non-assigning party to act with good faith and in a
commercially reasonable manner in refusing to give consent for the assignment of
an agreement where the agreement is silent regarding the anticipated standard of
conduct in withholding consent.
This case arose out of an agreement between Dick Broadcasting
Company (“DBC”) and Oak Ridge FM, Inc. (“Oak Ridge FM”). Both companies
were licensees for various radio stations in Knoxville, Tennessee, and surrounding
areas. In 1997, DBC and Oak Ridge FM entered into three separate but related
agreements including a Time Brokerage Agreement, a Consulting Agreement, and
a Right-of-First-Refusal Agreement (“ROFR”) that gave DBC the right to
purchase at a discount substantially all of Oak Ridge FM’s assets used in the
operation of its radio station. While all three agreements contained assignment
provisions, the ROFR, the central agreement at issue, was assignable only with
the written consent of Oak Ridge FM. This provision was silent regarding the
expected standard of conduct of Oak Ridge FM in withholding consent.
Three years later, DBC sought to sell most of its radio station assets,
including the ROFR with Oak Ridge FM, to Citadel Broadcasting Company
(“Citadel”). However, when Oak Ridge FM learned of the proposed deal, it
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refused to consent to the assignment. Despite DBC’s offer to guarantee Citadel’s
obligations under the ROFR, Oak Ridge FM continued to withhold consent.
DBC ultimately finalized the deal with Citadel only after a $10 million reduction
in sales price, without assignment of the ROFR.
DBC brought suit against Oak Ridge FM alleging that Oak Ridge FM
breached the ROFR by “wrongfully and unreasonably withholding consent” to
the assignment in order to attempt a more profitable agreement with Citadel.
DBC also alleged that “[an] implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
applied to the [ROFR] and that [Oak Ridge FM] breached the agreement by
failing to act reasonably and in good faith.” While Oak Ridge FM admitted to
withholding consent, it denied any breach of contract.
The trial court granted Oak Ridge FM’s motion for summary judgment,
holding that an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was not applicable
to the ROFR and that Oak Ridge FM, therefore, did not breach the ROFR by
refusing consent. The Tennessee Court of Appeals, however, vacated the award
of summary judgment, holding that an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing did indeed apply to the ROFR and that summary judgment was improper
due to genuine issues of material fact. On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court
upheld the court of appeals’ ruling.
Under de novo review, the Tennessee Supreme Court analyzed whether
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing applied to the silent consent
clause, first noting that, as early as 1922, Tennessee courts imposed an implied
condition of reasonableness in contracts. In Robeson & Weaver v. Ramsey, 245 S.W.
413 (Tenn. 1922), the court considered a case where a party claimed to have an
absolute right to find the sale of land “unsatisfactory” and rejected a standard
allowing the parties to act “capriciously” in making such a determination. Where
the agreement was silent as to the standard of conduct anticipated by the parties,
the court held that the parties must act in a commercially reasonable manner.
Citing the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and accepted contract law
principles in other jurisdictions, the Tennessee Supreme Court further noted that
Tennessee law has firmly established an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in the performance and enforcement of every contract. The court
referenced Town & Country Equipment, Inc. v. Deere & Co., 133 F. Supp. 2d 655
(W.D. Tenn. 2000), in which the United States District Court for the Western
District of Tennessee imposed a reasonableness and good faith requirement upon
an assignment provision with a silent consent clause. In Town & Country, the
agreement between the parties provided that the dealer could only assign the
agreement with the prior consent of Deere. When Deere refused to approve
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assignment to anyone other than Deere’s preferred buyer, the dealer sued. The
district court cited the well-established implied duty of good faith and fair dealing
under Tennessee law and held that Deere did not have the right to “unreasonably
limit or interfere with the sale.”
Oak Ridge FM argued that the ruling in Town & Country, echoed by other
jurisdictions referenced in Dick Broadcasting, represents a “minority rule.” Oak
Ridge FM asserted that the majority of courts addressing the issue of a silent
consent clause have applied a traditional common-law view that parties may
refuse consent “arbitrarily or unreasonably.” The Tennessee Supreme Court
disagreed, finding that “the former ‘majority rule’ approach has steadily eroded
over time and is now a minority position among the courts that have considered
the issue.” While fourteen jurisdictions continue to follow the older view that a
party may arbitrarily or unreasonably refuse consent under a silent consent clause,
seventeen jurisdictions have adopted the “modern” position, imposing an implied
duty of good faith and fair dealing when interpreting a silent consent clause.
Oak Ridge FM further argued that the trial court was correct in finding
that imposing a duty of good faith and fair dealing on the consent clause “would .
. . in effect . . . add a new provision to the contract which the parties were free to
add themselves.” The court again disagreed, noting that the obligation of good
faith and fair dealing does not expand or add additional contractual obligations,
but rather “protects the parties’ reasonable expectations as well as their right to
receive the benefits of their agreement.” Moreover, at the time the parties
entered into this agreement, Tennessee law had firmly established that the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied in every contract. The court
stated the established rule, recently reaffirmed in Ellis v. Pauline S. Sprouse Residuary
Trust, 280 S.W.3d 806 (Tenn. 2009), that the law existing at the time and place of
a contract becomes a part of the contract and, “in the absence of evidence of a
contrary intention, the parties must be held to have contemplated the application
of that law to the terms of their agreement.” Thus, the Dick Broadcasting court
found that “the application of the duty of good faith and fair dealing is . . . a
matter of enforcing the parties’ agreed-upon contract, and refusing to apply the
duty would . . . vary the terms of the . . . agreement.” (internal quotation marks
omitted). The court concluded that, “when [an] agreement does not specify the
standard of conduct for withholding consent, a party’s decision to refuse consent
must be made in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner.”
The Tennessee Supreme Court’s ruling in Dick Broadcasting is an important
reminder to transactional attorneys that Tennessee law imposes a duty of good
faith and fair dealing on the enforcement of every contract. Parties are free to
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contract for any standard of decision-making that does not offend public policy;
however, if they wish to allow conduct that deviates from established principles,
they must explicitly do so in their written agreement. This holding clearly
articulates that under Tennessee law, the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing will be applied to all consent provisions absent the parties’ explicit intent
to avoid such imposition. Therefore, attorneys must be sure to include a clear
standard of conduct clause within an assignment consent provision in any
contract in which the parties do not wish to be bound by the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.

CONTRACTS
In Tennessee, a liquidated damages provision that does not bear a
reasonable relationship to the amount of damages that are likely to result
from a breach of the agreement is an unlawful penalty and will not be
enforced. Bachour v. Mason, No. M2012-00092-COA-R3-CV, 2013 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 366; 2013 WL 2395027 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2012).
By Jacob Spangler
In Bachour v. Mason, the Tennessee Court of Appeals considered whether a
provision in a real estate sale contract entitling the buyer to retain a certain large
portion of the contract price in the event of the seller’s default was enforceable in
light of the portion’s admittedly “arbitrary” nature. While the reasons it cited
were different from the dispositive factors considered by the trial court, the court
of appeals nevertheless affirmed the trial court’s judgment, refusing to enforce the
provision and ordering the buyer to deliver the full contract price.
In June 2007, Jalal Bachour (“Bachour”) entered into a contract with
Devin Mason (“Mason”) and Craig Mears (“Mears”) to purchase two adjacent
lots, which Bachour intended to later sell at a profit. The initial contract price was
$300,000. In August of the same year, the parties executed an addendum to the
agreement, which separated the purchase price of the two lots, with the prices
totaling the sum of $300,000. According to the addendum, the price of one of
the lots was $275,000, and the other was set at $25,000. That same month,
Bachour entered into another contract to sell both lots to a third party wishing to
build an Auto Zone auto parts store at a price of $325,000. This agreement was
contingent upon Bachour’s successful closing of the purchase from Mason and
Mears.
In October, Mason and Mears entered into an agreement with Southern
Villages, Inc. (“Southern Villages”), under which Southern Villages would
construct roads adjacent to the lots. Immediately before closing the $275,000
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purchase and sale of the first lot, Bachour presented Mason and Mears with a new
contract for sale, which provided that only $200,000 of the purchase price was
due at closing, and that the remaining balance of $75,000 would become due and
payable within thirty days of the completion of the roads. The new contract
further provided that if the roads were not completed by July 1, 2008, Mason and
Mears would forfeit the entire $75,000 payment. Bachour presented the contract
on the day of closing and told Mason and Mears that if they did not accept the
terms of the new agreement, he would leave the deal. Mason and Mears accepted
the new contract and the sale was closed on the same day; accordingly, Bachour
delivered only the $200,000 sum required by the new contract.
Construction on the roads began in May 2008, and a public official
declared the roads completed on June 30, just one day before the deadline in the
agreement. Bachour employed an engineer shortly thereafter to perform an
independent inspection of the roads, and although the engineer concurred that
the roads were technically completed, he found that “shoulder work, grading[,]
and drainage were still in progress and far from completion.” On August 5, 2008,
Bachour filed a complaint against Mason and Mears seeking a declaratory
judgment that the roads were not completed by the July 1 deadline and that
Mason and Mears therefore were not entitled to the $75,000 balance on the
purchase and sale contract.
In his pre-trial depositions, Bachour referred to the $75,000 sum as a
“penalty” or as “a heavy penalty,” and stated that he wished that the “penalty”
was higher, “like $150,000.” At trial, Bachour declined to refer to the figure as a
penalty, instead calling it an “incentive” to finish the road quickly. Nevertheless,
Bachour still acknowledged the payment as arbitrary and “not based on any
particular estimate of potential damages.” The potential damage that Bachour
cited was an alleged decrease in the value of the property due to the road’s
arguable non-completion, amid a time of falling real estate prices. The chancery
court held that the new contract presented on the day of closing was invalid for
want of new consideration to make it enforceable. Bachour appealed the
decision.
As discussed in the court of appeals’ opinion, Tennessee “has always
placed a high value on the freedom to contract.” Parties to a contract are free to
agree to whatever they wish, subject only to the condition that “the contract is
not against public policy.” An appropriate liquidated damages provision is
consistent with Tennessee’s public policy, as it contemplates real damages that
“are likely to be uncertain and not easily proven.” However, liquidated damages
provisions are “subject to close scrutiny because of the public policy against

506

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 15

forfeitures.” There must be some evidence of a reasonable relationship between
the amount of the liquidated damages calculation and the actual amount of
damages that might reasonably be expected to arise out of a breach of the
agreement. In the absence of such a reasonable relationship, courts will interpret
the provision as a penalty for breach rather than a liquidated damages provision.
Such penalties are contrary to the public policy of Tennessee, and are hence
unlawful and unenforceable.
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that the provision in the
new contract bore no reasonable relationship to the actual damages that might be
reasonably expected, and therefore refused to enforce it against Mason and
Mears. In search of evidence of a reasonable relationship, the court turned to the
facts of the case that led to the agreement and compared them to the provision’s
terms, checking for any significant correlation. However, the court found “no
evidence to support [Bachour’s] contention that the [$75,000] figure bears any
relation to the potential damages he likely would have suffered.” Bachour
referred to the provision as “a penalty” and “a heavy penalty” and stated that he
wished he had asked for a greater figure in his deposition. Bachour himself even
described the number as “arbitrary,” and at no point attempted “to justify it in
terms of the magnitude of his losses.” Despite his statements that he should have
asked for more in damages, the court found that, at the time of the trial, Bachour
still had not suffered any actual damages. The court also found that the parties
had not discussed the amount listed in the provision, as Bachour showed it to
Mason and Mears on the day of closing and apparently refused to negotiate any of
its terms. Finally, the court found that the deadline specified was of no material
significance to any damages that Bachour might have suffered. Although
Bachour had already entered into an agreement under which he would promptly
resell the lots to Auto Zone after closing, there was no evidence that Auto Zone
had required completion of the roads by any date. This made the date seem
arbitrarily chosen as well.
These factual observations informed the court’s conclusion that the
$75,000 figure “was just an arbitrary figure that [Bachour] plucked from thin air.”
Finding no reasonable relationship between the terms of the provision and the
potential damages that Bachour might reasonably have suffered, the court
interpreted the provision as an unlawful penalty rather than a liquidated damages
provision, and thus refused to enforce it. Accordingly, it affirmed the judgment
of the trial court. Following this decision, the Tennessee Supreme Court tacitly
expressed its approval when it denied Bachour’s application to appeal. Bachour v.
Mason, No. M2012-00092-SC-R11-CV, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 845 (Tenn. Oct. 16,
2013).
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Transactional attorneys working in Tennessee can use the reasoning of
Bachour v. Mason to direct their drafting of liquidated damages provisions. Because
these provisions must bear a reasonable relationship to the actual damages that
might reasonably be suffered in the event of a breach, drafters would be welladvised to illustrate that relationship to the best of their abilities. There is
perhaps no better way of accomplishing this than by working evidence directly
into the terms of the agreement. In conjunction with a liquidated damages
provision, a drafter could integrate the exact calculation method used to arrive at
the figure. This would demonstrate how the figure came to be and contravene
any assertion that the number was selected arbitrarily. The more detailed the
calculation, the less room there will be to question its validity. Also, drafters may
wish to note specifically, by way of recitals, that the parties agree that actual
damages will be uncertain and difficult to prove, and that they have jointly
negotiated to arrive at the provision that exists in the contract. Through careful
drafting, transactional attorneys should be able to set aside any doubts as to a
liquidated damages provision’s origin and enforceability.	
  

FEDERAL TAX	
  
Severance payments made to terminated employees that vary based on the
employees’ seniority or type of work performed and are not linked to the
receipt of state unemployment benefits are taxable wages under FICA. In
re Quality Stores, Inc., 693 F.3d 605 (6th Cir. 2012), rev’d, U.S. v. Quality Stores, Inc.,
12-1408, 2014 WL 1168968 (U.S. Mar. 25, 2014).
By Karen Anderson
In hearing In re Quality Stores, Inc., the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit considered whether severance payments made by a corporation to its
salaried and hourly employees who permanently lost their jobs when the company
filed for bankruptcy constituted Supplemental Unemployment Benefits (“SUB”)
payments under federal law and whether SUB payments are taxable under the
Federal Insurance Contributions Act (“FICA”).
Since the 1950s, companies have had the option to supplement funds
received from state unemployment programs by issuing SUB payments to their
employees after they are laid off. SUB payments are not intended to compensate
employees for any specific work performed, though the amount received may
increase along with years served at a company.
In 2001, Quality Stores, Inc., then America’s largest agricultural-specialty
retailer, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. In doing so, the company closed nearly
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four hundred stores and twelve distribution centers, as well as terminated
positions for all its employees—more than seventy-five—in its corporate office.
Quality Stores granted severance payments to all of its employees whose positions
were involuntarily terminated through two set severance plans. Initially, Quality
Stores reported the severance pay it issued as gross income to its employees,
declaring it as “wages” on W-2 forms and withholding federal income tax.
Additionally, it paid the employer’s share of the FICA tax. All employee wages
are subject to the FICA tax, which is paid by both the employer and employee
and is used to fund the federal Social Security and Medicare programs.
Later, Quality Stores sought a refund from the Internal Revenue Service
(“IRS”) on the $1,000,125 it paid in FICA taxes. It argued that the severance
payments it gave to its employees whose positions had been involuntarily
terminated did not qualify as “wages” under FICA and were instead SUB
payments.
In pursuit of a tax refund, Quality Stores brought suit against the IRS in
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Michigan and
received permission from nearly two thousand former employees to pursue FICA
refunds on their behalf as well. The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment
in favor of Quality Stores. The Government appealed to the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Michigan, which affirmed the bankruptcy court’s
ruling against the Government. The Sixth Circuit heard the case de novo because it
originated in bankruptcy court where a ruling was made solely based on stipulated
facts and cross motions for summary judgment.
In considering this case, the court of appeals first addressed whether SUB
payments are wages. The court began this analysis by deducing what distinction
Congress intended to make between SUB payments and wages. Starting with the
Supreme Court’s decision in Coffy v. Republican Steele, 100 S. Ct. 2100, 2102 (1980),
the Quality Stores court found that SUB payments are not related to services
performed, because, by definition, employees only qualify for such payments after
they are no longer employed by the company. Conversely, the Internal Revenue
Code (“I.R.C.”) defines wages under FICA in I.R.C. § 3121(a) as “all
remuneration from employment” where money is paid for a service worked. This
essentially mirrors the definition for “wages” used for federal income tax
purposes in I.R.C. § 3401(a).
Further showing its intent, Congress addressed SUB payments for
purposes of federal income tax in a subsection titled “Extension of withholding
to certain payments other than wages,” in I.R.C. § 3402(o). Additionally,
Congress stated in I.R.C. § 3402(o)(1) that a SUB payment “shall be treated as if it
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were a payment of wages” for income tax purposes. (emphasis added). The title
of the section and plain meaning of the statute imply that Congress saw SUB
payments as distinct from wages for income tax purposes.
The court reasoned that because SUB payments are not wages for income
tax purposes and FICA defines “wages” the same way as it is defined for income
taxes, then SUB payments are not considered wages for FICA either. The court
supported this reasoning through the ease of administration argument that the
Supreme Court asserted in Rowan Companies, Inc. v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 2288
(1981). The Quality Stores court relied on Rowan to find that, because Congress
defined “wages” identically in the income tax and FICA statutes, the term was
assumed to carry the same meaning in both contexts.
The next step in the court’s analysis was to determine what distinguishes a
payment as a “SUB payment.” Based on I.R.C. § 3402(o)(2)(A), the Quality Stores
court identified five elements of a SUB payment: (1) an amount paid to an
employee; (2) pursuant to an employer’s plan; (3) because of an employee’s
involuntary separation from employment, whether temporary or permanent; (4)
resulting directly from a reduction in force, the discontinuance of a plant or
operation, or other similar conditions; and (5) which is included in the employee’s
gross income. The court found that Quality Stores’ severance payments met each
of these five elements. The payments were made pursuant to a specific plan
following the permanent termination of employment that was the direct result of
a reduction in force and discontinuation of a plant and was included in gross
income under I.R.C. § 61 because it enriched the recipients.
The Sixth Circuit held that, under Congress’s five-part definition of SUB
payments in I.R.C. § 3402(o)(2)(A), the severance payments Quality Stores made
qualified as SUB payments. Furthermore, the court held that it is the clear intent
of Congress that SUB payments are distinct from wages and therefore not subject
to the FICA tax. This holding was driven by applying “clear congressional
intent” based primarily on the plain meaning of two statutes—I.R.C. §§ 3121(a)
and 3402(o)—to find that SUB payments are distinct from wages. Congress
defined “wages” as payment for work performed, but individuals do not qualify
for SUB payments until they are no longer employed and thus unable to perform
any services. The court held that Quality Stores and its former employees who
joined the suit were entitled to a refund for the amount paid in FICA tax.
In 2013, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari and, in 2014, it
eventually rejected the lower courts’ distinction between severance payments and
taxable wages in I.R.C. § 3402(o) for FICA purposes. Instead, the Supreme Court
held that severance payments made to terminated employees can be taxable
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wages. Under I.R.C. § 3121(a)-(b), FICA defines “wages” as “all remuneration
for employment,” where “employment” is “any service . . . performed . . . by an
employee for an employer.” The Court emphasized that, like in Social Security
Board v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358 (1946), the term “service” in I.R.C. § 3121(b)
includes the entire employer-employee relationship for which compensation is
paid to the employee, not merely work actually done directly for compensation.
Severance payments fall within these parameters, because they can be made only
to former employees, and they are made in consideration of past employment.
This reasoning implicated the payments in this case, as the amounts paid by
Quality Stores went only to its former employees and were based on the
individual recipients’ length of service and position at the company. Additionally,
the severance payments were not connected to the former employee’s receipt of
state unemployment benefits. For these reasons, the Court found that Quality
Stores’ severance payments are included in FICA’s definition of wages, and thus
subject to the tax.
Retracing the Congressional intent of I.R.C. § 3402(o), the Court also
found that the statute “does not narrow the term ‘wages’ under FICA to exempt
all severance payments.” Consistent with Rowan, the definition of “wages” should
be substantially the same for purposes of FICA and income-tax withholding in
the interest of “simplicity of administration and consistency of statutory
interpretation.”
Quality Stores could have two important implications for transactional
attorneys. First, this case gives clear instructions for the treatment of severance
payments under FICA. Severance payments made to terminated employees that
vary based on the employees’ seniority or type of work performed and are not
linked to the receipt of state unemployment benefits are taxable wages under
FICA.
Second, on a more theoretical level, this case gives transactional attorneys
a means to reign-in IRS overreach. Throughout the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in
Quality Stores, the court references “clear congressional intention” as a reminder to
the IRS that its role is to enforce laws without writing new ones. When Congress
has clearly stated its intentions, the IRS must listen. In its closing in Quality Stores,
the Sixth Circuit went to great lengths to distinguish what the role of the IRS is
not. The court filled nearly all its short conclusion with a reminder that, “[w]hile
the Supreme Court may ultimately provide us with the correct resolution of these
difficult issues under the law as it currently stands, only Congress can clarify the
statutes concerning the imposition of FICA tax on SUB payments.” Although
the Supreme Court reversed the holding of the Sixth Circuit, they followed a
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similar analysis, also emphasizing the significance congressional intent has when
interpreting the Internal Revenue Code. However, unlike the Sixth Circuit, the
Supreme Court also stressed Congress’s goal of ease of administration and
simplicity within the law. Nevertheless, future transactional attorneys can
reference Quality Stores to emphasize the limited powers of the IRS.

FEDERAL TAX	
  
Following substance over form, the Supreme Court held that the U.K.
windfall tax can be predominately characterized as an excess profits tax,
and is therefore creditable against U.S. federal income taxes under Internal
Revenue Code § 901(b)(1). PPL Corp. v. C.I.R., 133 S.Ct. 1897 (2013).
By Michael Crowder
PPL Corporation (“PPL”) was part-owner of a privatized U.K. company
subject to the U.K. “windfall” tax, and claimed a credit for its share of the
windfall tax bill in its 1997 U.S. federal income tax return, relying on Internal
Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”) § 901(b)(1), which states that any “income, war profits,
and excess profits taxes” paid overseas are creditable against U.S. income taxes.
In PPL Corp. v. Commissioner, the Supreme Court addressed whether the windfall
tax could be predominately characterized as an income, war profits, or excess
profits tax through analysis of the formula used to calculate the windfall tax.
I.R.C. § 901(b)(1) provides that any “income, war profits, and excess
profits taxes” paid overseas are creditable against U.S. federal income taxes.
Treasury Regulation § 1.901-2(a)(1), which codifies longstanding doctrine dating
back to Biddle v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 573, 578-79 (1938), interprets this section
to mean that a foreign tax is creditable if its “predominant character . . . is that of
an income tax in the U.S. sense,” meaning that if a foreign tax operates as an
income, war profits, or excess profits tax for most taxpayers, it is generally
creditable. Additionally, foreign tax creditability depends not on the way a foreign
government characterizes its tax but on whether the tax, if enacted in the U.S.,
would be an income, war profits, or excess profits tax.1 Giving further form to
these principles, Treasury Regulation § 1.901-2(a)(3)(i) explains that a foreign tax's
predominant character is that of a U.S. income tax “[i]f . . . the foreign tax is likely
to reach net gain in the normal circumstances in which it applies.” Three tests set
forth in the regulations provide guidance in making this assessment.2 These tests
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See Treas. Reg. § 1.901–2(a)(1)(ii).

2

See Treas. Reg. § 1.901–2(b)(1).
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indicate that net gain consists of realized gross receipts reduced by the significant
costs and expenses attributable to such gross receipts. Accordingly, net gain
means net income. Therefore, Treasury Regulation § 1.901-2 provides that a
foreign tax that reaches net income, or profits, is creditable.
In PPL Corp. v. Commissioner, petitioner PPL was part-owner of South
Western Electricity plc. During the 1980's and 1990's, the U.K.'s Conservative
Party controlled Parliament and privatized a number of government-owned
companies. As part of the privatization, many companies were required to
continue providing services at the same rates they had offered under government
control for a fixed period, typically their first four years of private operation (the
“Initial Period”). The companies were still permitted to increase profits during
this period, but because of the fixed rates, could only do so by operating more
efficiently. Responding to market incentives, many of the companies became
dramatically more efficient and earned substantial profits in the process.
In 1997 the Labor Party took control of Parliament and adopted a tax on
any of the so-called “windfall” profits earned during the Initial Period. South
Western Electricity was one of twelve government-owned electric companies that
were privatized in 1990 and that were subject to the tax. South Western
Electricity's total U.K. windfall tax burden was £90,419,265. In its 1997 U.S.
federal income-tax return, PPL claimed a credit under I.R.C. § 901 for its share of
the windfall tax bill.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (the
“Commissioner”) rejected the claim, but the Tax Court held that the U.K.
windfall tax was creditable for U.S. tax purposes under I.R.C. § 901. The Third
Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The 1997 Parliament calculated the tax imposed on the “windfall” profits
using a formula where the tax amount = 23% x [365 x ((P/D) x 9) – V], where D
equals the number of days a company was subject to fixed rates, P equals the total
profits earned during the Initial Period, and V equals the value of the company
during the Initial Period. The Third Circuit held that the tax did not qualify under
I.R.C. § 901 in large part because it believed the tax reached some form of
valuation rather than net income or profits. The Third Circuit looked no further
than the Labor government’s assertion that the term [365 x (P/D) x 9]
represented what the companies’ values should have been given the assumed
price-to-earnings ratio of nine (which was selected because it was the lowest
average price-to-earnings ratio of any of the windfall-tax-liable companies during
the initial period), and that, therefore, the entire formula simply imposed a tax on
the difference between what the companies’ values should have been and what
they actually were.
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The Supreme Court disagreed and concluded that the predominant
character of the windfall tax was that of an excess profits tax, and as such, it
qualified under I.R.C. § 901. The Court reasoned that the Labor government’s
conception of value as a backward-looking analysis of historic profits was not a
“recognized valuation method” and was “fictitious.” Rather than a tax on value,
the Court held that the windfall tax was a tax on realized net income and asserted
that the tax calculation formula confirmed this result. The Court algebraically
rearranged the tax calculation formula to have the tax amount = 51.71% x [P –
(V/9) x 4.0027]. The Court observed that, under this arrangement, [(V/9) x
4.0027] represented the amount of total “acceptable profits,” in effect meaning
that a company was to be taxed on profit that exceeded one-ninth of the
company’s value multiplied by 4.0027. Therefore, this rearrangement of the tax
calculation formula had the effect of taxing the difference between a company’s
actual profits (P) and what its profits should have been. In other words, at least for
the companies that had 1,461-day Initial Periods,3 the tax formula’s substantive
effect was to impose a 51.71% tax on all profits earned above the threshold.
This, the Court concluded, was a classic excess profits tax and qualified for
treatment under I.R.C. § 901.
In light of this decision, transactional attorneys and tax attorneys alike
should be aware that, in terms of characterizing a tax, the Supreme Court will not
hesitate to follow substance over form, especially when the form being followed
is “fictitious” or does not use a “recognized method.” More specifically, U.S.
courts are not bound by the tax base that foreign taxes purport to adopt. Such a
rigid construction is unwarranted, and cannot be squared with the principle that
“tax law deals in economic realities, not legal abstractions.” Despite what a tax
proposes to reach in form, if a single algebraic reformulation of the tax formula
substantively reaches income or profits, even if other reformulations are possible,
then such a tax will likely qualify under I.R.C. § 901(b)(1).

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  
It should be noted that five of the thirty-two companies had different lengths for their initial
periods. In her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor found that both the tax rate and the excess profits
threshold differed for companies with different initial periods. Because of these differences, she
concluded that the tax was really a tax on “average profits” rather than a tax on excess profits.
She reasoned that average daily profits multiplied by a price-to-earnings ratio is a recognized way
of approximating value, rather than a way of approximating income, and as such, this tax would
not qualify under I.R.C. § 901. However, this reasoning could not apply in this case because the
Government rejected the notion that the “outlier” companies were relevant to the creditability
analysis, and so Justice Sotomayor joined with the majority.
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INSURANCE
Under Tennessee law, an insurer claiming no duty to defend and
indemnify an insured contractor must prove that the contractor’s faulty
work did not cause any damage to components other than the ones the
contractor installed and that the faulty work was not performed by a
subcontractor. Forrest Const., Inc. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 703 F.3d 359 (6th Cir.
2013)
By Kevin Davis
In Forrest Construction, Inc. v. Cincinnati Insurance Co., the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered whether an insurer owed a duty to
defend and indemnify an insured contractor. Specifically, the court considered if
there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the contractor’s faulty
construction of the foundation of its client’s residence triggered a duty for the
insurer to defend and indemnify the contractor. The court held that the insurer
owed a duty to defend and indemnify the contractor because the insurer failed to
prove that the contractor’s faulty work did not cause damage to components
other than the ones the contractor installed and that the faulty work was not
performed by a subcontractor.
This case began when Forrest Construction, Inc. (“Forrest”) filed suit
against Cincinnati Insurance Co. (“Cincinnati”), alleging that Cincinnati breached
the parties’ contract by failing to defend and indemnify Forrest in a faulty
construction lawsuit. Prior to the lawsuit, Forrest and Cincinnati agreed to a
standard commercial general liability (“CGL”) policy. The CGL policy imposed a
duty on Cincinnati to “pay those sums that [Forrest] becomes legally obligated to
pay as damage because of bodily injury or property damage.” Furthermore,
Cincinnati had a duty to defend Forrest against any suit alleging that Forrest’s
faulty construction caused property damage.
While the CGL policy imposed a duty on Cincinnati to indemnify and
defend Forrest, the CGL policy limited this duty by narrowly defining property
damage and by limiting the scope of liability. The CGL policy stated that
“property damage” only occurs if there is “physical injury” to a piece of tangible
property. “Physical injury” was then defined to include all loss of use of tangible
property, even tangible property that was not harmed physically. Furthermore,
the CGL policy limited Cincinnati’s duty to indemnify and defend by limiting the
scope of the policy’s coverage. The CGL policy contained a “your work”
exclusion provision which stated that Cincinnati was not obligated to indemnify
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and defend Forrest if the property damage arose from work performed by
Forrest. However, the CGL policy contained a subcontractor exception which
stated that the “your work” exclusion does not apply to property damage that
arose from work performed by a subcontractor on Forrest’s behalf.
In 2004, Forrest was hired to build a residence for James and Debbie
Laughlin (the “Laughlins”) in Brentwood, Tennessee. Forrest and the Laughlins
disagreed over the amount the Laughlins owed Forrest for its work on their
residence. As a result, Forrest filed suit against the Laughlins. The Laughlins
responded with a countercomplaint alleging that Forrest negligently constructed
the residence, causing significant cracking in the foundation. Forrest notified
Cincinnati of the Laughlins’ counter-complaint and requested that Cincinnati
defend and indemnify them in the matter.
Cincinnati denied that it owed Forrest a duty to defend and indemnify,
arguing that, while the Laughlins’ countercomplaint alleged physical damages, the
alleged damages fell within the “your work” exclusion provision. Cincinnati also
stated in its refusal letter that it owed no duty to indemnify and defend because
the countercomplaint did not state that a subcontractor performed Forrest’s
construction work, which would trigger the subcontractor exception. As result of
Cincinnati’s denial of coverage, Forrest filed suit against Cincinnati, alleging
breach of contract. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee granted summary
judgment for Forrest. Consequently, Cincinnati appealed.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
granted summary judgment in favor of Forrest. The court held that Cincinnati
had a duty to defend Forrest against the Laughlins’ counterclaims. In reaching its
decision, the court considered whether there was genuine issue of material fact as
to whether Cincinnati had a duty to defend Forrest. The court first examined
whether the CGL policy covered the damage that occurred to the Laughlins’
residence. The court defined “property damage” as damage that occurred to a
component other than those that either the insured contractor installed or hired a
subcontractor to install. The court then referenced Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Moore
& Associates, 216 S.W.3d 302, 310 (Tenn. 2007), and found that “faulty
workmanship” occurred when damages are only for replacement of a defective
component the contractor installed or hired a subcontractor to install.
Furthermore, the court noted that there is a significant legal distinction between
property damage and faulty workmanship. If property damage occurred, then
Cincinnati had a duty to defend Forrest under the CGL policy. However, if the
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damage resulted from faulty workmanship, then Cincinnati had no duty to defend
Forrest under the CGL policy.
Having examined the legal distinction between property damage and
faulty workmanship, the court found that the countercomplaint sufficiently
alleged property damage. The countercomplaint alleged that the installed
components caused significant cracking in the foundation of the Laughlins’
residence. In light of this allegation, the court found that property damage had
occurred because the installation caused physical damage to components other
than the ones installed.
After finding that there was property damage, the court considered
whether coverage was negated by the “your work” exclusion. It first noted that
the “your work” exclusion excluded coverage when the insured party performed
the construction work. It noted that the countercomplaint alleged that Forrest
“performed, or caused to be performed,” defective work. The court found that
this language implied that Forrest may have hired a subcontractor who performed
the defective work. Thus, the court recognized that the subcontractor exception
applied and thereby defeated the “your work” exclusion. Thus, the court held
that Cincinnati had a duty to defend and indemnify Forrest.
In light of the Forrest decision, transactional attorneys should be cognizant
of the fact that, even though a “your work” exclusion may initially preclude
coverage under a CGL policy, they must prove that an insured contractor did not
hire subcontractors whose faulty work actually caused property damage. It is not
enough for transactional attorneys to argue that a subcontractor exception does
not apply because the complaint against the insured contractor does not explicitly
state that subcontractors were used by the insured contractor. Such attorneys
must prove that the property damage was not caused by a subcontractor, but
rather by the insured contractor itself.

REAL ESTATE
In Tennessee, allegations in a court filing provide neither sufficient notice
nor opportunity to cure to allow a lender to subject a defaulting borrower to
personal liability for the outstanding debt on a non-recourse loan. Fed. Nat'l
Mortg. Ass'n v. TN Metro Holdings XII, No. M2012-01803-COA-R3-CV, 2013
Tenn. App. LEXIS 330, 2013 WL 2146440 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 14, 2013).
By Drew Clark
In Federal National Mortgage Association v. TN Metro Holdings XII, the
Tennessee Court of Appeals determined whether a borrower was given sufficient
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notice of a default that would subject both the borrower and its key principal to
personal liability under a non-recourse loan. The borrower, TN Metro Holdings
XII ("TN Metro"), owned an apartment complex upon which the Federal
National Mortgage Association ("FNMA") foreclosed. Although the loan was
non-recourse, there were two exceptions to the non-recourse provision that
would subject both TN Metro and its key principal, Selim Zherka (“Mr. Zherka”),
to personal liability for the debt. FNMA did not provide notice that TN Metro
had defaulted in such a manner as to render TN Metro and Mr. Zherka personally
liable until after the deed of trust had been foreclosed and the property sold at a
foreclosure sale.
On April 25, 2007, TN Metro executed a promissory note in the amount
of $8,616,000 in order to buy an apartment complex in Hendersonville,
Tennessee. As security, TN Metro executed a deed of trust, security agreement,
and assignment of rents (collectively, the "Security Instruments") in favor of the
lender. Although the promissory note was non-recourse, it provided for personal
liability of TN Metro and its key principal in two situations: (1) if, after default,
TN Metro failed to pay the lender all rents to which the lender was entitled or
misapplied such rents as provided for in the Security Instruments; or (2) if TN
Metro transferred the property in a manner that was considered an Event of
Default under the Security Instruments. The Security Instruments stated that the
creation of any lien on the property constituted a transfer that was an Event of
Default. The Security Instruments also provided that the "[l]ender shall provide
[TN Metro] written notice of any Non-Monetary Default" and that "[TN Metro]
shall have a period of thirty (30) days" after receiving such written notice in which
to cure the default. Furthermore, the Security Instruments stated that any nonmonetary default "shall not be deemed to have occurred" until TN Metro's
opportunity to cure had expired.
On March 2, 2011, FNMA filed a complaint for foreclosure and damages
against TN Metro for failure to make payments on the loan.1 The foreclosure was
granted and the property was sold in a foreclosure sale on June 1, 2011 for $4.1
million. Following the sale, FNMA filed an amended complaint alleging that the
outstanding debt on the note as of June 1, 2011 was $9,498,221.59, of which $4.1
million had been satisfied by the foreclosure sale, leaving a deficiency in the
amount of $6,784,519. The amended complaint further alleged that TN Metro
and Mr. Zherka were personally liable for the deficiency because (1) TN Metro
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  

The promissory note and Security Instrument were initially executed in favor of Sovereign Bank.
Although not explicitly stated in the opinion, it seems that the note and Security Instruments were
later assigned to FNMA.
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failed to pay the rents from the property that were due to FNMA, and (2) TN
Metro allowed the property to become encumbered by a number of liens. FNMA
alleged that these actions by TN Metro constituted Events of Default under the
Security Instruments. Upon FNMA's motion for summary judgment, the trial
court found that the allegations of the amended complaint satisfied the Security
Instruments’ notice requirement for non-monetary defaults. As such, the trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of FNMA and found both TN Metro
and Mr. Zherka to be jointly and severally liable for any deficiency.
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that the allegations of
FNMA's amended complaint did not constitute effective notice as required by the
Security Instruments. In coming to this conclusion, the court relied on basic
principles of contract interpretation. Because courts presume that the intent of
the parties is specifically expressed in the contract itself, the court sought to
determine if the terms of the contract were ambiguous. The court found that the
repeated use of the word "shall" was not ambiguous and clearly showed that
FMNA was required to give TN Metro both notice and an opportunity to cure.
In the absence of such notice and opportunity to cure, the Security Instruments
provided that no Event of Default actually occurred. The court noted that the
intent and purpose of the notice and cure requirements was to avoid default and
subsequent litigation. Furthermore, the legal authority cited by FNMA to justify
substituting the amended complaint for actual notice were not applicable to the
specific facts of the case at bar. Finally, while failing to find any ambiguity in the
terms of the Security Instruments, the court stated that even if ambiguities
existed, they should be construed against FNMA as the drafter of the document.
For these reasons, the trial court's ruling was overturned.2
The ruling in this case does little to change the current state of the law in
Tennessee. In reaching its conclusion, the Tennessee Court of Appeals relied on
long-settled principles of contract interpretation. To the extent that the current
FNMA standard forms contain provisions similar to those at issue in this case,
transactional attorneys should be aware that the mandatory notice and
opportunity to cure requirements imposed upon lenders will be enforced by the
courts. Although the court implied that allegations in a complaint may satisfy a
notice requirement in certain circumstances, it would behoove lenders to provide
adequate notice of a default and an opportunity to cure before bringing
borrowers into court.
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  
The court also dealt with the question of whether genuine issues of material fact existed in the
case at bar. Because that aspect of the ruling dealt solely with the standard of summary judgment
and not any aspect of transactional law, it has not been discussed.
2
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REAL ESTATE
For purposes of an inverse condemnation action against a municipality, an
executory contract between developers and a homeowners’ association can
convey a compensable interest in property to the homeowners’ association
even if legal title remains in the developers. Willowmet Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v.
City of Brentwood, M2012-01315-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 2152522, 2013 Tenn.
App. LEXIS 336 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 16, 2013).
By Nathaniel Foxworthy Greene
In Willowmet Homeowners Association, Inc. v. City of Brentwood, the Tennessee
Court of Appeals addressed whether a homeowners’ association was entitled to
compensation under the Tennessee inverse condemnation statute where a
municipality purchased property from two developers after the developers had
previously contracted to transfer the same property to the homeowners’
association. In its determination of whether inverse condemnation was available
to the homeowners’ association, the court was faced with determining whether an
executory contract conveyed a compensable interest in the property to the
homeowners’ association even though legal title remained in the developers. The
Tennessee Court of Appeals held that the executory contract acted to shift
equitable title to the homeowners’ association, and the association was therefore
entitled to compensation for its valuable property interest.
In Willowmet, Centex Homes and Tiara Development, LLC (the
“Developers”) developed Willowmet, a residential subdivision located in
Brentwood, Tennessee, in 2000 and 2001. As part of the development process,
the Developers recorded a Declaration of Protective Covenants, Conditions, and
Restrictions for Willowmet (the “Declaration”) on August 24, 2001. Acting in
accordance with the Declaration, the Developers subsequently incorporated the
Willowmet Homeowners’ Association (the “Association”) in December of 2001.
In addition to the requirement that the Developers create the Association, the
Declaration also mandated that, prior to the sale of the first lot of the subdivision,
the Developers had to convey all of the open space of Willowmet to the
Association. Although the first lot was conveyed to an individual lot owner on
March 28, 2002, the Developers did not convey any of the open space to the
Association until 2011.
Furthermore, before the 2011 conveyance of the open space to the
Association, the Developers were approached by the City of Brentwood (the
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“City”) because the City needed to acquire a portion of the open space of
Willowmet in order to widen a public road. After the City conducted a title
search, which revealed the previously recorded Declaration, the Developers each
granted the City an easement to widen the road in exchange for compensation
from the City. These two “Right-of-Way and Easement Conveyances” were
promptly recorded. Soon thereafter, the Developers conveyed their remaining
interests in the open space of Willowmet to the Association by quit-claim deed.
On June 17, 2011, the Association initiated an inverse condemnation action
against the City seeking compensation for its lost property rights in the open
space the City had purchased.
In Tennessee, inverse condemnation “is the popular description for a
cause of action brought by a property owner to recover the value of real property
that has been taken for public use by a government defendant even though no
formal condemnation proceeding has been instituted.” Furthermore, a “taking”
for inverse condemnation purposes consists of an action taken by the
government authority that “destroys, interrupts, or interferes with the common
and necessary use of the real property of another.” This right of inverse
condemnation is codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-16-123, and
the statute provides that, if the government authority has taken possession of the
land, the property owner is entitled to a jury determination of the damages and,
additionally, a sum determined by the court to “reimburse such [owner] for
reasonable costs, disbursements and expenses, including reasonable attorney . . .
fees” incurred as part of the inverse condemnation proceeding. However, if the
ownership status of an inverse condemnation plaintiff is challenged, the burden is
on the plaintiff to prove that it has an ownership interest in the property.
In the Williamson County Circuit Court, the City and the Association
filed competing motions for summary judgment, and the circuit court dismissed
the action on the City’s motion. The court concluded that the inverse
condemnation statute did not apply because the City obtained the property under
color of title. The circuit court further concluded that, even if the inverse
condemnation statute applied, the Association did not own any compensable
property rights in the open space conveyed to the City, and thus, summary
dismissal would still be appropriate.
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s
decision and remanded the case with instructions to grant the Association’s
motion on the City’s inverse condemnation liability and for a determination of the
Association’s damages. With regard to the trial court’s “color of title” argument,
the court of appeals found that, even though the documents executed by the
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Developers may have purported to transfer ownership of the property to the City,
thus passing color of title, previous case law dealing with similar facts only
restricted the ability of property owners to succeed in an ejectment action.
Where, as in Willowmet, the property owner is seeking compensation for the
property interest rather than a return of the property itself, an inverse
condemnation action is an available and appropriate avenue for recovery. In
addition, the court of appeals explained that the Developers’ contractual
obligation to transfer the open space to the Association, as recorded in the
Declaration, acted to pass equitable title to the Association, thus creating a
compensable property interest in the open space.
In support of its determination that the Association’s property interest
was compensable, the court of appeals explained that “once the Declaration was
recorded and the Association was incorporated, the Developers were under an
affirmative, executory duty to deed the [open space] to the Association.” Even
though the Developers were in breach of their duty following the sale of the first
lot in 2002, the executory duty was not discharged, and thus, the Developers were
still obligated to convey the property to the Association. Citing the general rule
of equitable rights arising from executory contracts, the court of appeals
explained that a valid contract for the purchase and sale of property acts as an
equitable conversion resulting in the purchaser being seen as the equitable owner
of the property. The court of appeals then concluded that, in Willowmet, the
Association was such a “purchaser” of the open space based on the Declaration,
and therefore, the Association was the equitable owner when the City purchased
the property from the Developers.
After establishing that the Association was the equitable owner of the
property, the court of appeals moved on to explain why such an interest was
compensable under the inverse condemnation statute. Despite the City’s
arguments that the Developers had the authority to extinguish the Association’s
interest by unilateral sale, the court of appeals found that where the City had
knowledge of the Association’s ownership interest, the City could not “bury its
head in the sand, ostrich like, and ignore the real outstanding interest.” Because
the Association was determined to be the equitable owner, and also because the
City had knowledge of the Association’s property interest due to the earlier title
search, the court found that the City was required to compensate the Association
for the value of its lost property interest.
Based on the ruling in Willowmet Homeowners Association, Inc. v. City of
Brentwood, attorneys representing a municipality in a condemnation proceeding or
a transaction in lieu of condemnation must ensure that all parties with a
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compensable interest in the property are included in the process in order to avoid
a later inverse condemnation lawsuit. Following Willowmet, such attorneys need to
be aware that the “list of parties with a compensable interest” clearly includes
parties that hold equitable title in the property, even if those parties do not yet
have legal title, if the municipality has actual or constructive knowledge of the
equitable interest.
For attorneys representing property owners in condemnation
proceedings, the clear takeaway from Willowmet is that legal title is not required to
succeed in an inverse condemnation proceeding against the government in
Tennessee. However, because Willowmet and previous cases have focused on
whether the government had knowledge of the equitable interest in the property,
attorneys representing property owners need to ensure that, if possible, the
interest is recorded before any condemnation proceeding is initiated or, in the
alternative, that the government is made aware of the interest at the earliest
juncture. It addition, it is also important for attorneys on the property owner’s
side to remember that the inverse condemnation statute provides for an award of
the costs of the proceeding, including attorney’s fees, which could serve as a point
of leverage.

SECURED TRANSACTIONS
Under Tennessee law, a creditor perfects a security interest in insurance
premiums when the debtor executes a valid security agreement covering
the premiums, even if it does not file a financing statement. Am. Bank v.
Cornerstone Cmty. Bank, 733 F.3d 609 (6th Cir. 2013).
By Michael Cottone
A secured creditor must take the steps required by law to perfect its
security interest to obtain an interest that is effective against other secured
creditors. In contests between creditors, several statutes—and the cases
interpreting them—provide rules for determining each creditor’s priority.
Tennessee law provides a carve-out from the general rules on perfection and
priority for security interests in financed insurance premiums, implicating, among
other things, notice concerns and the priority of banks holding security interests
in deposit accounts that may contain financed premiums. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in American Bank v. Cornerstone Community
Bank, considered these issues and strengthened the position of creditors with a
security interest in financed insurance premiums.
	
  

2014]

CASE COMMENTARIES

523

In American Bank v. Cornerstone Community Bank, American Bank
(“American”) provided a $429,991 loan to Saberline Transportation (“Saberline”)
as financing for an insurance premium. Saberline executed a security agreement
giving American a security interest in “all unearned premiums.” The insurance
contract with Praetorian Insurance Company (“Praetorian”) required Saberline to
pay premiums for an entire year in advance, with premiums for each month
becoming “earned” once Praetorian provided coverage for that month. In the
event of default, American was entitled to cancel the policy and obtain all
unearned premiums from Praetorian. The funds for the premiums were to be
held in an account owned by U.S. Insurance Group (“U.S. Insurance”), the
broker, at Cornerstone Bank (“Cornerstone”), and then forwarded to Praetorian
as they were earned.
U.S. Insurance, however, directed American to deposit the funds in its
general operating account rather than a trust account. U.S. Insurance owed
money to Cornerstone “and authorized [it] to conduct daily sweeps of the
operating account and apply anything over $50,000 to the debt.” Therefore, upon
American depositing the funds in the account, Cornerstone “cleared the account
of Saberline’s money and reduced [U.S. Insurance’s] debt.”
Saberline immediately defaulted, and American terminated the policy with
Praetorian. When U.S Insurance returned the unearned premiums, however, it
did so not from its operating account at Cornerstone, but rather from an account
at a different bank. U.S. Insurance then filed for bankruptcy, “turning this last
transfer into a preference payment.” After settling with the bankruptcy trustee,
American brought suit against Cornerstone, asserting that it “had a superior
security interest in the disputed funds and that Cornerstone was liable for
conversion.”
Appearing in a separate title from Tennessee’s version of the Uniform
Commercial Code, sections 56-37-101 through 56-37-115 of the Tennessee Code
Annotated contain the perfection and priority rules for security interests in
financed insurance premiums under Tennessee state law. Section 56-37-112
provides that such security interests are perfected “if the buyer or borrower signs
a written security agreement assigning a security interest to the seller, seller’s
assignee, or lender” and that “[n]o filing . . . shall be necessary to perfect the
validity of such agreement as a secured transaction.” As the American Bank court
noted, “perfection of the security interest [occurs] upon execution of [a] written
premium financing agreement and payment of the insurance premium.” Section
56-37-112 further provides that perfected security interests in financed insurance
premiums have priority over “creditors, subsequent purchasers, pledgees,
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encumbrances, trustees in bankruptcy or any other insolvency proceeding under
any law[,] or anyone having the status or power of the aforementioned or their
successors or assigns.”
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed the district court and held that American had a perfected security
interest under section 56-37-112, that this interest took priority over
Cornerstone’s interest as a “creditor” or “subsequent purchaser,” and that
Cornerstone was liable to American for conversion. The Sixth Circuit also
rejected Cornerstone’s waiver and laches defenses.
As an initial matter, the court held that American’s interest fell within
section 56-37-112. Because Saberline executed a written agreement giving
American “a security interest in . . . any and all unearned premiums and dividends
which may be payable under the insurance policies,” the court found that
Saberline “sign[ed] a written agreement assigning a security interest to the . . .
lender.” Therefore, American held a perfected security interest under section 5637-112.
Next, the court held that American’s interest took priority over
Cornerstone’s. Interests perfected under section 56-37-112 have priority over a
variety of other interests, and the court found that “Cornerstone [fell] into at least
two lower-priority categories.” First, Cornerstone was a “creditor” for purposes
of section 56-37-112. In making this determination, the court looked to the
general definition of “creditor” in section 47-1-201(3) of the Tennessee Code
Annotated, which includes “a general creditor, a secured creditor, a lien creditor,
and any representative of creditors.” The court concluded that this “definition . .
. cover[ed] Cornerstone.” Second, the court determined that Cornerstone was
also a “subsequent purchaser” under section 56-37-112 because secured creditors
are included in the definition of “subsequent purchaser” under section 47-9-401
of the Tennessee Code Annotated. Therefore, American’s interest had priority.
In determining that American had priority over Cornerstone, the court
specifically rejected Cornerstone’s argument that its security interest in U.S.
Insurance’s operating account had priority by virtue of being “held by the bank
with which the deposit account is maintained” under section 47-9-327(3) of the
Tennessee Code Annotated. Noting that when two statutes conflict, “courts
customarily seek to honor as much of the competing laws as they can by giving
priority to the more specific piece of legislation,” the court found that section
56-37-112 was more specific than section 47-9-327(3) because the former dealt
with interests related to insurance premium financing while the latter covered
deposit accounts generally.
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The court ultimately found that Cornerstone was liable for conversion of
the funds American deposited in U.S. Insurance’s operating account. The court
found that, under Tennessee law, conversion occurs when a party “appropriat[es]
. . . another’s property to [its] own use and benefit, by the exercise of dominion
over the property, in defiance of the owner’s right to the property,” whether or
not it acted in good faith. Here, Cornerstone “exercised dominion and control”
by applying American’s deposited funds to U.S. Insurance’s debt and Cornerstone
benefitted because its risk of non-payment of the debt was reduced. Therefore,
because the sweeps “defied . . . American’s senior security interest in the
contested funds,” Cornerstone was liable for conversion.
American Bank demonstrates two main points. First, this case illustrates
the need for secured lenders of all stripes to insist on separate, isolated trust
accounts for depositing funds covered by a security interest. Although American
ultimately prevailed against Cornerstone, this was only after having its initial
payment taken back by a bankruptcy trustee as a preference, incurring what were
likely substantial litigation costs in bringing an action against Cornerstone and
defending an appeal, and losing the time-value of its money. Much of this
expense and inconvenience could have been avoided had American insisted on
depositing the funds into a separate account that it could monitor.
Second, and more specifically, this case demonstrates the risk of hidden
liens to banks that take security interests in their customers’ deposit accounts. As
illustrated by this case, banks must be aware of all statutory exceptions to the
general filing or possession requirement for perfecting security interests, not just
those contained in Tennessee’s version of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Because of these statutory exceptions, a bank performing sweeps of a customer’s
account risks conversion liability if it does not ensure that no hidden liens exist on
funds in the account. However, by their very nature, hidden liens can be hard to
uncover, so the best solution is likely for creditors to perform due diligence in
determining where account funds come from, especially for particularly large
deposits.

SECURED TRANSACTIONS
Under Chapter 9 of Tennessee’s Uniform Commercial Code, the inclusion
of “proceeds” of collateral in a financing statement is not adequate to
perfect a security interest in accounts receivable arising from the debtor’s
use of the collateral. 1st Source Bank v. Wilson Bank & Trust, 735 F.3d 500 (6th
Cir. 2013).
By Will Hooper
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When leveraged businesses fail, secured creditors frequently become
entangled in disputes over who has priority over the various assets that the failed
business has pledged as collateral. These disputes often turn on which creditor
was the first to perfect its security interest by filing a financing statement that
adequately describes the collateral, regardless of which creditor actually first
obtained a security interest in the assets. In 1st Source Bank v. Wilson Bank & Trust,
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that, under Tennessee law, a
financing statement describing collateral as certain assets and “all proceeds
thereof, including rental and/or lease receipts,” did not perfect a security interest
in accounts receivable arising from the debtor’s use of the collateral.
In 1st Source Bank v. Wilson Bank & Trust, 1st Source Bank (“1st Source”)
entered into a series of transactions with K&K Trucking and J.E.A. Leasing
(collectively, the “Debtors”) in which 1st Source financed the Debtors’
acquisition of tractors, trailers, and other equipment. In each transaction, the
Debtors executed security agreements granting 1st Source a security interest in
the Debtors’ tractors and/or trailers, accounts, and proceeds from the collateral.
Further, 1st Source filed a financing statement in accordance with Tennessee law
for each transaction, each of which listed the specified tractors and/or trailers
serving as collateral for the transaction along with “all proceeds thereof, including
rental and/or lease receipts.” These financing statements did not, however,
include the term “accounts.”
Sometime after 1st Source filed its financing statements, several other
creditors (collectively, the “Defendants”) entered into subsequent secured
transactions with the Debtors in which the Debtors pledged their accounts as
collateral. In each subsequent transaction, the Debtors and the Defendants
executed valid security agreements and the Defendants filed financing statements
in accordance with Tennessee law that specifically provided that each of the
Defendants had a security interest in “all accounts receivable now outstanding or
hereafter arising.”
The Debtors eventually defaulted on their obligations, and 1st Source
repossessed the physical collateral covered by its security agreements while the
Defendants took possession of the Debtors’ accounts receivable. 1st Source then
filed suit against the Defendants, seeking a declaratory judgment of its priority in
the accounts receivable in accordance with its security agreements and financing
statements. In response, the Defendants contended that, regardless of the
inclusion of accounts in the security agreement between 1st Source and the
Debtors, the financing statements filed by 1st Source did not name accounts, and
such accounts could not properly be classified as proceeds of the specifically
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listed collateral. Thus, the Defendants claimed that 1st Source’s security interest
in the accounts receivable was not perfected, and, therefore, the Defendants had
priority. The District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee granted the
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and 1st Source appealed.
Pursuant to Chapter 9 of Tennessee’s Uniform Commercial Code,
codified at Tennessee Code Annotated sections 47-9-101 et seq., (“Chapter 9”), a
perfected security interest prevails over an unperfected security interest, even
where the unperfected security interest was obtained first. A security interest
attaches to assets identified as collateral at the instant of the creation of an
enforceable security interest, which occurs at the time a security agreement is
executed between the creditor and the debtor. Such interests generally are not
perfected, however, until a financing statement that adequately describes the
covered collateral has been filed in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 9.
The purpose of requiring such financing statements to be filed is to put third
parties on notice that the creditor has a security interest in that collateral.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit analyzed the financing
statement filed by 1st Source to determine whether the statements adequately
described the claimed collateral—the accounts receivable—so as to put the
Defendants on notice that 1st Source had a security interest in those assets at the
time the Defendants extended credit to the Debtors. Because the financing
statements listed a number of specific types of collateral, but made no mention of
“accounts” or “accounts receivable,” the court applied the maxim expression unius
est exclusio alterius, meaning the expression of one or more things in a class implies
the exclusion of others, to hold that the language in the financing statement
limited the collateral to the assets actually identified, and therefore did not
adequately describe the accounts receivable so as to perfect 1st Source’s security
interest.
The court then considered 1st Source’s argument that the inclusion of the
term “proceeds” in the financing statement should encompass the accounts
receivable, because the accounts receivable were presumably derived from the
rental and use of the listed collateral.
Pursuant to Chapter 9, “proceeds” includes “whatever is collected on, or
distributed on account of, collateral” and “rights arising out of collateral.” Tenn.
Code Ann. § 47-9-102(a)(64) (2013). According to the official comments by the
drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code, however, the term “proceeds” was
not intended to refer to income generated from the debtor’s own use and
possession of the goods or to situations where there was not an actual
dispossession of the debtor’s interest in the collateral.
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The Sixth Circuit, without mentioning the language in the financing
statement modifying “proceeds” to specifically include rental and leasing receipts,
reasoned that Chapter 9 specifically defined “accounts” separately from
“proceeds,” and that classifying accounts receivable as proceeds would “render
the [former] term . . . meaningless.” Furthermore, the court noted decisions from
several other jurisdictions that uniformly support the proposition that revenues
earned through the use of collateral are not proceeds, specifically citing CLC
Equipment Co. v. Brewer, 139 F.3d 543, 546 (5th Cir. 1998), in which the Fifth
Circuit expressed concern that treating the products and revenues from the use of
collateral as proceeds would effectively give a creditor with a security interest in
equipment a security interest in all items and revenues produced by the
equipment. Thus, the court held that “proceeds” in this case could not include
the Debtors’ accounts receivable, and affirmed the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to the Defendants.
The Sixth Circuit’s decision in 1st Source Bank v. Wilson Bank & Trust
should serve as a warning to transactional attorneys to exercise great care in
drafting financing statements to perfect their clients’ security interests. In this
case, the drafting attorney may have believed that the inclusion of the language
“all proceeds thereof, including rental and/or lease receipts” in the financing
statement would be sufficient to include the Debtors’ accounts receivable, which
were specifically listed on the security agreements, but as the case demonstrated,
this was not enough. To protect their clients, transactional attorneys should
ensure that the descriptions of collateral used in financing statements describe all
of the assets covered by their clients’ security agreements with great specificity
and accuracy. Further, even in the most routine transactions, transactional
attorneys should carefully review the language used in financing statements, as the
attorney in this case could have discovered and corrected his or her omission of
the term “accounts” in one of the subsequent transactions.

WILLS & ESTATES
A contract to execute mutual wills is enforceable when the consideration
for the contract is mutual promises not to amend or revoke the respective
wills. Furthermore, a claim that a will violates such contractual obligations
can be properly brought as a claim against the estate, as part of a will
contest, or as an action for specific performance with the applicable
procedural and jurisdictional requirements applying to each type of action.
In re Estate of Brown, 402 S.W.3d 193 (Tenn. 2013).
By Jared Hagler
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In the case of In re Estate of Brown, the Tennessee Supreme Court was
faced with whether a will, executed in contravention of a contract between
spouses to make mutual unalterable and irrevocable wills even after the death of
the other spouse, is valid, or whether such a contract is unenforceable for lack of
consideration leaving the surviving spouse with the full rights to alter, amend, or
revoke her will. Furthermore, the court examined the procedural requirements
for a claim challenging a will that contravenes such contractual obligations and
concluded that such a claim can be brought in one of three types of actions.
Roy E. Brown Jr. (“Mr. Brown”) and Ina Ruth Brown (“Mrs. Brown”)
were the two spouses whose joint estate plan was at issue in this case. Each had
been married before their marriage to one another and each had children from
the previous marriage. During the course of their marriage the two jointly owned
property, including valuable real property, as tenants by the entireties. To ensure
that neither spouse could disinherit the other’s children from the previous
marriage, the couple executed a contract (the “Contract”) stating that after the
death of one of them, the surviving spouse forfeits all rights to change his or her
will that was executed on the same day as the Contract. Along with the Contract,
dated June 13, 2002, both Mr. and Mrs. Brown executed wills giving the other a
life estate in all real property owned separately or jointly with the other, and upon
the death of the surviving spouse, all property would pass to the couple’s
surviving children (the “Original Wills”). After Mr. Brown’s death on June 19,
2002, Mrs. Brown, in violation of the Contract, executed a new will on June 28,
2002 (the “New Will”). The New Will left Mrs. Brown’s entire estate to Mr.
Rockford Estes (“Mr. Estes”), a son from her previous marriage. After Mrs.
Brown died on February 1, 2003, Mr. Estes filed the New Will for probate
without any of Mr. Brown’s children even being aware of the New Will’s
existence. Mr. Brown’s children attempted to probate Mrs. Brown’s Old Will, but
they quickly found that Mr. Estes was already attempting to probate the New
Will. Mr. Brown’s children contested the New Will on grounds that it was
executed under the undue influence of Mr. Estes and that the Contract was valid
and enforceable, thereby making the New Will null and void. Mr. Estes denied
exerting undue influence over his mother, Mrs. Brown, in connection to the New
Will and argued that the Contract was unenforceable because it lacked the
necessary contractual element of consideration.
The trial court found that Mr. Brown’s children failed to prove that the
New Will was the product of undue influence by Mr. Estes. However, the trial
court further found that the Contract did have the requisite consideration to be
valid and enforceable. Therefore, the trial court held that the New Will, which
was executed in violation of the Contract, was null and void. Mr. Estes appealed
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the trial court’s ruling, claiming that the trial court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the dispute and that the trial court erred in finding adequate
consideration for the Contract. However, the Tennessee Court of Appeals
rejected Mr. Estes’s arguments and upheld the ruling of the trial court. Mr. Estes
then appealed to the Tennessee Supreme Court for review of the same issues and
was granted certiorari.
Reviewing the case de novo with no presumption of correctness, the
Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the judgments of the lower courts. On Mr.
Estes’s claim that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to the late
filing of Mr. Brown’s children’s claim, the court ruled that an assertion of
untimely filing is a challenge to the sufficiency of a claim and not to the
competency of the court to properly hear the claim. Moreover, the court held
that the statute of limitations that Mr. Estes was seeking to apply to his
opponent’s claim was not necessarily applicable. The court noted that Mr. Estes’s
assertion that the claim was untimely rested on the notion that the only way to
challenge a will on the grounds that it violates a contract to make mutual wills is
to file a claim against the estate, which must be done within one year of the
decedent’s death. However, the court stated that such a claim can also be
brought as a will contest or an action for specific performance of the contract.
Under Tennessee law, the statute of limitations on will contests is two years after
the order admitting the challenged will to probate. Because Mr. Brown’s children
brought this claim as a part of a will contest and the claim fell within the allowed
statutory period of two years, the claim was timely and the court could adjudicate
the dispute.
The court then turned to Mr. Estes’s claim that the Contract should fail
for lack of adequate consideration.
After explaining the necessity of
consideration to make any contract valid, the court quickly found the presence of
adequate consideration in the Contract. The consideration needed to make the
Contract lay in the forfeiture of each spouse’s right to amend or revoke his or her
will once the other spouse had died and each spouse’s right to dispose of property
by any other means than that specified in the Original Wills. The court found
that these mutual promises not to alter the wills or the disposition of property
were fairly contemplated and deliberate; thus, the Contract was enforceable, and
the New Will was void.
The case of In re Estate of Brown presents two very important issues in
regard to estate planning. First, the Tennessee Supreme Court ruled that a mutual
promise to forfeit one’s testamentary rights of amending or revoking one’s own
will is adequate consideration for a contract to make mutual wills. Transactional
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attorneys utilizing contracts for mutual wills as an estate planning tool can rest
assured that the mutual promises of the testators will be adequate consideration
and that the contract will survive a challenge to its enforceability on this ground.
Second, In re Estate of Brown addressed what type of claim is a challenge to a will
based upon connection to a prior contract. In denying Mr. Estes’s argument that
the claim was not timely filed, the court noted that such a claim can be made as a
claim against the estate, as part of a will contest, or as an action for specific
performance of the contract; each of these claims may have different statutes of
limitations, which may affect the timeliness of their filing. Thus, according to the
rule in this case, a claimant lodging this type of claim has three options for the
type of action being brought. Because the various options carry with them
distinct procedural requirements that must be followed, an attorney who is
arranging a contract for mutual wills should be mindful of the types of actions
and there attendant requirements that can be brought if a will violates the
contractual rights or obligations. Such awareness will support the estate planning
process for clients seeking mutual wills.

